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ABSTRACT
The skill premium fell substantially in the ﬁrst part of the 20th century, and then rose at the end
of the century. I argue that these changes are connected to the organization of production. When
production is organized into large plants, jobs become routinized, favoring less skilled workers.
Building on the notion that numerically controlled machines made capital more “ﬂexible” at the
end of the century, the model allows for changes in the ability of capital to do a wide variety of
tasks. When calibrated to data on the distribution of plant sizes, the model can account for between
half and two-thirds of the movement in the skill premium over the century. It is also in accord with
a variety of industry level evidence.
∗I thank Tom Holmes for extensive discussions on the subject. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
During the latter part of the twentieth century, the skill premium rose substantially.
The change has prompted a huge literature attempting to explain the change (see Bound
and Johnson (1992)). Theories of “skill biased technological change” posit that changes in
the skill premium are driven by technological changes. A variety of reasons for skill bias
are possible. For instance, following Grilliches (1969), Krusell et al. (2000) consider the
possibility of capital-skill complementarity. They use data on the price of equipment for the
latter part of the century to show that improved machinery can explain the rising premium if
capital is more substitutable with low skilled labor than it is with high skilled labor. Others
focus directly on computers and the impact of the information technology revolution on wages
(Dunne, et al. (2000)).
There is an important relationship between plant size and the skill premium over the
20th century. During the ﬁrst half of the century, plant size rose and the skill premium
fell. At the end of the century, the skill premium rose as plant size fell. The next section
documents the relationship. The exercise in this paper is to develop a model to explain that
relationship.
In the model, a plant is deﬁned by a ﬁxed set of tasks. Each input must pay a ﬁxed
cost for each task that it undertakes. The deﬁnition of skilled labor in this paper is that its
ﬁxed cost is smaller. In other words, skilled labor is more able than unskilled labor to the
extent that it must do many tasks. Whereas models such as the one in Krusell et al. (2000)
focus on an aggregate production function, and are therefore silent on plant size, here many
plants will operate with their size determined by the classic U-shaped cost curve arising from
a ﬁxed cost followed by a region of decreasing returns.As labor inputs become highly specialized, that is, do few tasks, the beneﬁt of skills
is reduced. In the assembly line, each worker does such a small set of tasks so that skills are
relatively unimportant. Given the assumption about skills, the comparative static exercise is
to change the ratio of ﬁxed to marginal costs for capital. The rise of mass production allowed
for a larger ﬁxed cost but lower marginal cost; ﬂexible machines of the present make capital
more ﬂexible and able to do a wider variety of tasks, so that congestion at the plant can
be avoided. When the ﬁxed cost for capital is relatively high, plants are large, workers are
very specialized, and the skill premium is low. This is the interpretation of the middle of the
century, when plants were larger and the skill premium was low.
Qualitatively, the model predicts the negative relationship between plant size and the
skill premium that is evident in the data. In order to understand the relationship in more
detail, the model is calibrated. The ﬁxed cost for capital is chosen for each time period so
that the model matches the plant size data exactly. Then the model’s implied skill premium
is compared to the actual one. The model is able to explain between half and two-thirds of
the movement in the skill premium.
At the heart of the story is that there is an important diﬀerence between the techno-
logical change of the ﬁrst and second halves of the century. During the ﬁrst half, the spread
of mass production led to larger manufacturing plants. Assembly lines replaced the customiz-
able batch production of skilled craft workers. Many jobs became routinized, and required
little of the skills that once were needed to produce the same product. The recent experience
of U.S. manufacturing is that ﬂexible, numerically controlled machines have allowed plants
to operate at a smaller scale (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). Production has shifted from the
traditional assembly line to batch processes using the new machines. As a result, workers are
2no longer as highly specialized in a single routinized task. Each batch is highly customizable,
and requires a worker who can manipulate the modern machinery and make it perform a
wide variety of tasks depending on the custom features of the batch.
Changes in the organization of production aﬀect the number of tasks a worker must
do, and therefore aﬀect the importance of skills. Skills make it easier for workers to do a
variety of tasks. A skilled craftsman at the turn of the century could do a wide variety of
tasks needed to complete a given item. On the other hand, a worker on the assembly line has
a very routinized, specialized task to perform. Because of the focus of the work on repeating
a single task, the problem solving skills that allow a worker to do a variety of tasks are not
required. As the Fordist factory has given way to smaller customized batches, the set of
problems that a worker needs to solve has grown, increasing the demand for skills.
One explanation of the falling skill premium in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ec e n t u r yi st h a t
technological change in capital goods was slow during that period, and therefore the mecha-
nism in Krusell et al. (2000) might just have been operating in reverse. However, during that
period, the diﬀusion of electricity led to new, highly productive technologies (Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2000)), contradicting this period as one of technological stagnation in equipment.
Moreover, the stock of skilled workers was growing relatively slowly during this period, mak-
ing it even more of a puzzle that technological progress did not drive up the skill premium. It
seems that the technological change of that period was substantial, but “de-skilling.” Adding
the role of specialization in determining the premium allows this model to explain both pe-
riods. Like Krusell et al. (2000), changes in the skill premium are linked to observables, as
opposed to computing skill bias as a residual as in, for instance, Bound and Johnson (1992).
One output of the calibrated model is a measure of the ﬂexibility of capital, measured
3by how costly it is for capital to do additional tasks. It is commonly held that the introduction
of numerically controlled machines has made capital more ﬂexible in the last 25 years; the
model suggests that setup costs for capital have fallen by more than a third.
Although the dominant force in the ﬁrst half of the century was the move to mass
production with highly specialized jobs, Goldin and Katz (1998) identify industries such
as chemical industries which moved to batch process methods during the early part of the
period.1 They show that these industries increased the employment share of skilled workers.
In other words, during a period where technological change seemed to be de-skilling, industries
that underwent organizational change resembling the ones that were dominant in the latter
part of the century had a skill bias.
On the other hand, Dunne, et al. (2000) ﬁnd that investment in computers is an
important determinant of wage dispersion across plants in the period from 1975. Speciﬁcally,
the dispersion between wages at high wage plants with high computer investment and wages
at low wage plants with low computer investment is signiﬁcant. Since the sort of ﬂexible
machines that allow for batch methods are closely connected to computers, this suggests
that organizational changes linked to these machines are precisely the sort of changes that
are skill-biased. These results further point to the relationship between the organization of
production and the distribution of wages that is the focus here.
Section 5 discusses this industry evidence. In addition to relating the model to existing
empirical results, I document by looking at the panel of manufacturing industries from 1977-
1994 that downsizing, in terms of a reduction in average plant size for a given industry, is
1For some industries, for instance soap making, “ﬂexible” machines were available well before the advent
of modern numerically controlled machines.
4related to an increase in average industry wages and an increase in productivity growth. This
is despite the fact that industries with larger plants pay higher wages overall. The pattern is
consistent with the forces outlined in the model.
The idea that organizational changes have impacted the skill premium is complemen-
tary to the standard skill-biased technological change story for explaining the latter part of
the century. Whereas Krusell et al. (2000) focus on the rate of improvement of new equip-
ment as the driving force in changes in the skill premium, the important change here is the
type of equipment, ﬂexible versus inﬂexible. It seems natural to think that both the eﬃciency
of capital and the nature of the production process are important determinants of the skill
premium, as Goldin and Katz (1998) suggest for the early part of the century and Dunne, et
al. (2000) suggest for the latter part of the century.
Three closely related papers are Mobius (2000), Caselli (1999), and Kaboski (2001).
In Mobius (2000), specialization in the product market changes endogenously as productivity
grows. The economy starts at a low level of productivity, using a constant returns technology
to produce specialized goods. When machines get more productive, the economy switches to
an industrialized economy. Because that technology exhibits increasing returns, the number
of varieties depends on the size of the market. Initially the market is small and there are few
varieties; subsequently the market is large enough to justify investment in machines for even
very specialized products. Fordism can be seen as a transition between the artisan economy
and the fully specialized industrialized economy. The skill premium rises as specialization
falls, just as in this model.
In Mobius (2000), the rise of numerically controlled machines is due to the desire to
5provide specialized products using industrial techniques.2 In other words, specialization is
driving the nature of technological change, similar to the model of directed technical change
in Acemoglu (1998). In this paper, the technological change is driving the change in special-
ization. This is consistent with the idea that the computer-aided technologies that have made
ﬂexible manufacturing possible arose for many other reasons other than the desire to increase
specialization; rather, producers have taken advantage of speciﬁcs c i e n t i ﬁc advantages. His-
torians such as Chandler (1977) have suggested that the rise in mass production was a result
of a very speciﬁc change in the production technology: the availability of a rail network in the
United States. My exercise can be thought of as taking the underlying technological change
as the exogenous force.
Caselli (1999) introduces a model where a technological revolution arises and can be
either skill biased or de-skilling. In his model, skills increase the speed of learning. In this
paper, skills make workers able to do more tasks, which is clearly closely related to the notion
that skilled workers learn faster. In Caselli (1999), when a revolution brings new machines
that are more learning-intensive, skilled workers relatively beneﬁt, since they are best suited
to the new machines. Kaboski (2001) also considers a model of the skill premium over the
20th century. Endogenous education choice and comparative advantage are the key forces.
The important novelty of the approach in this paper is that the size of plants is used
to infer how much is being undertaken by each worker in each time period, and therefore
how much needs to be “learned.” The data on the average plant size are used to undertake a
quantitative exercise, asking how much of the change in the skill premium can be explained
2Thesmar and Theonig (2000) use a similar model with increasing returns to scale to study the impact of
globalization on the skill premium.
6in this way.
2. Plant Size and the Wage Premium
A. Basic Facts
At the beginning of the twentieth century, manufacturing was still largely based on
craftspeople and artisans. The disparity in wages between high skilled and low skilled workers
was dramatic. Figure 1 shows the time series for the skill premium, measured as the return
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Figure 1: The Skill Premium
I choose to use the return to college because of the availability of a century-long series
for it. Other measures of wage dispersion, for instance the 90-10 or 80-20 wage ratio, are
similar: a substantial fall in the ﬁrst half of the century, followed by an increase in the last
quarter of the century.
At the same time that the skill premium fell, plants became organized into larger
7entities. The reverse was true during the last part of the century. Figure 2 shows production
workers per establishment from the Census of Manufactures3.
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Figure 2: Plant Size
In the ﬁrst half of the century, mass production and the rise of “Fordism” led to radical
changes in the way production was organized. Craftspeople were replaced by assembly lines.
The return to skill plummeted as jobs were routinized on the assembly line and workers did
not need the same sorts of skills. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the return to
skill rose sharply. As the plant size data show, the organization of production also changed
substantially over that period.
3The data prior to 1982 are taken from the 1982 Census. 1954 is missing the number of establishments,
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Figure 3: The Skill Premium and the Inverse of Plant Size
The recent decline in the size of establishments has been documented (see, for instance,
Davis and Haltiwanger (1991)). Such a revolutionary change in the organization of production
is interesting in its own right as an economic phenomenon to be documented and explained.
That it is so closely related to changes in the wage premium makes it even more interesting.
To see the relationship, consider Figure 3, which shows the skill premium and the inverse
of plant size, as percentages of their 1995 values. The remainder of the paper is devoted to
developing a model that has the feature that plant size and the skill premium are inversely
related, and then to quantify the model to see to what extent it can help us understand the
movement of the skill premium over the course of the century.
3. Modelling Input Flexibility
Recently, there has been substantial discussion of how information technology and
numerically controlled machines have changed manufacturing (for a summary, see Comin
9(2000)). In this section, a model is introduced where the changes in plant size and wages
come about due to changes in the “ﬂexibility” of capital. The model captures the idea,
introduced previously, that high skill workers are more able to do a variety of tasks. One way
to think of this is that skill brings ﬂexibility. To induce changes in size over time, the model
allows that the ﬂexibility of capital might change. Flexibility of capital is modeled exactly
as ﬂexibility if modeled for workers: being ﬂexible means being able to do a variety of tasks.
When capital becomes more ﬂexible, plants shrink and high skill workers beneﬁt.
A. Plants
Each manufacturing plant does a variety of tasks with total mass A.E a c h t a s k i s








where σ ∈ (0,1).
Each task is produced using two factors, capital and labor. For inputs kz and lz of the
two factors, the intensity x(z) is x(z)=g(f(kz,l z)), where f is a constant returns, constant
elasticity of substitution production function with ﬁnite elasticity of substitution ε ≥ 0,a n d
g is a strictly concave function representing congestion of a ﬁx e df a c t o ra si nL u c a s( 1978).
For simplicity, let g(x)=xγ for γ ∈ (0,1). Since there is no gain in combining inputs of
diﬀerent skill levels within the same plant, and inputs will be optimally chosen symmetrically
across tasks for a plant using a given skill level, there is no need to maintain the z subscripts
on k and l. Instead, denote the inputs per task by k and lj for a plant using workers of type
10j.L e t K = Ak and Lj = Alj, so gross output at a plant is F(K,Lj)=A1−γf(K,Lj)γ.
Tasks require setup. This is the sense in which inputs have a level of ﬂexibility:
ﬂexibility refers to being able to do a wide variety of tasks at low setup cost. A shipyard,
for instance, might use a numerically controlled machine which can read a design from a
computer ﬁle and cut the appropriately shaped piece of steel. A less ﬂexible machine might
be well suited to cutting a speciﬁc shape, but not as ﬂexible in doing a variety of shapes
(Kalpakjian (1995)). One way to interpret a plant at a point in time is as a batch: when low
setup costs prevail, it is relatively inexpensive to make output in small batches: when setup
costs are high, output must take place in large batches to be economical.
All inputs have setup costs. The setup cost per task is given by aj for labor of skill
level j and b for capital. Labor comes in many skill levels, indexed by aj,w h e r ej ∈ {1,...,N}
and j0 >jimplies higher skill so aj0 <a j. In a given time period, there is only one type of
capital.
A natural measure of ﬂexibility of capital is 1/b:i fb =0 , tasks have no setup costs, so
capital can be spread across as many diﬀerent tasks as desired with no loss, a sort of “inﬁnite”
ﬂexibility. Notice that output is ﬁnite for a ﬁnite quantity of inﬁnitely ﬂexible capital, it just
is not limited by the set of tasks. As b gets large, the set of tasks the capital undertakes must
shrink if the capital is to be useful.
The model works equally well if one interprets b as a ratio of ﬁxed to marginal costs.
That is, a higher b amounts to a technology where ﬁxed costs are relatively more important,
as, say, ﬁxed costs are higher but in turn lead to lower marginal cost for that input. To
simplify the discussion, the marginal eﬀect of capital is ﬁxed here at one while b varies.
There is another sector in the economy with a constant returns production function
11and perfect substitutability between capital and labor, i.e., it produces non-manufactured
output yn with
yn = K + L.
B. Consumers
The representative household has preferences for the manufactured good cm and the
non-manufactured good cn described by
u(cm,c n)=( cm)
θ (cn − κ)
1−θ ,
where utility is zero when cn < κ.A s s u m eκ > max{ ¯ K,1}, so that both capital and labor
will be used in the production of the non-manufactured good. This assumption is simply
to guarantee that non-manufactured goods are not unrealistically 100 percent intensive in a
single input.
The household has a fraction λj of its unit labor endowment in the form of skill level
j a n di se n d o w e dw i t h ¯ K units of capital, and so faces the budget constraint
pcm + cn ≤ λ · w + r ¯ K
for a vector of wages w and price of capital r. Manufacturing output has a price p.T h e
non-manufactured good is the numeraire. Elastic labor can be easily added to the model; it
is also straightforward (but notationally cumbersome) to imbed this description of technology
into a dynamic model of capital accumulation.
12C. Equilibrium
There is free entry into each industry. Zero proﬁts in the non-manufactured sector
imply r =1and w1 =1 . In manufacturing, since the mass of tasks is A,a n da l la r e
undertaken at the plant, the total setup cost is
rbA+ wjajA.




pF(K,Lj) − rbA− wjajA − rK − wjLj =0
where the equality comes from free entry driving proﬁts to zero.
For manufacturing, denote L∗
m,j(w) the labor demand for skill j and K∗
m,j(w) the
capital demand per plant with workers of type j.T h e r e i s a m a s s Mj of manufacturing
plants employing labor of type j. Total labor and capital demands are L∗
n,j(w) and K∗
n(w)
for the representative ﬁrm in the non-manufactured sector. Denote c∗
i(w) the ﬁnal goods
























13The non-manufactured sector clears by Walras’ Law.
Next, the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the model for plant size and the
skill premium are considered. In a later section concerning robustness, an alternative model
speciﬁcation is considered where the interest rate is ﬁxed outside the economy (a “small
open economy”). None of the following results are altered importantly. In that model, the
speciﬁcations of the preferences and the non-manufactured sector are irrelevant; zero proﬁt
conditions in manufacturing are enough to determine the wages,4 showing that the results
are not hinging on the details of the speciﬁcation of preferences and the non-manufactured
good technology.
4. Capital Flexibility and The Skill Premium
A. Qualitative Results
The model has an unambiguous prediction about the connection between capital ﬂex-
ibility b and both plant size and the skill premium if the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is small enough.
Proposition 1. Suppose γ > ε−1
ε .T h el o w e ri sb, the smaller are manufacturing plants, in
terms of workers per establishment, and the larger is the skill premium, logwj0 − logwj,f o r
j0 >j .
The intuition for the condition on γ and ε is that the condition ensures that more
capital at a plant raises the optimal number of employees at a given plant. To the extent
that capital and labor are complements, capital increases the marginal product of labor and
4This is true so long as manufacturing uses all types of labor. The numerical exercise includes two types,
so this is plausible.
14therefore increases the optimal labor choice. On the other hand, to the extent that there are
decreasing returns at the plant level, increased capital makes the marginal product of labor
lower, since it makes the bite of the decreasing returns more severe. The condition guarantees
that the latter eﬀect is outweighed by the former by assuming that the complementarity is
large relative to the decreasing returns parameter.5
Notice that for 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, that is, for f(k,l) ranging from Cobb-Douglas to Leontief
(often considered the empirically relevant range), the condition holds since γ > 0 > ρ.A s
the task level technology becomes perfectly substitutable between capital and labor, any
decreasing returns will eventually lead to capital and labor being negatively associated.
Violation of the condition seems implausible, since it would imply that plants with
more employees employ less total capital, which is counterfactual. It is well known that plants
with more workers not only employ more capital, but in fact are more capital intensive (see
Hamermesh (1980)).
Under the regularity condition of proposition 1,a ni n c r e a s ei nb not only increases
plant size, but it also decreases the skill premium. A rise in b makes the eﬃcient plant size
greater, which makes workers more specialized. This allows the low skilled workers to pay
their setup cost on only a few tasks. This result can be interpreted as saying that the model
can qualitatively explain the experience of the twentieth century. Consider an economy where
b varies. As b rises, plants get larger and the skill premium falls. This is an interpretation
of the experience of the ﬁrst half of the century. During the second half, b falls as capital
becomes more ﬂexible with the advent of numerically controlled machines, leading to smaller
5If the decreasing returns were just in labor, so that output was f(k,g(l)), the parameter restriction would
be unnecessary.
15plants and a higher skill premium.
Next the model is parameterized to see to what extent it can quantitatively account
for the movement of the skill premium.
B. Quantitative Analysis
Benchmark
The model is parameterized according to the following thought experiment. Suppose
that there are two skill levels, j ∈ {1,2}, corresponding to low skill and high skill, with costs
a2 and a1 There is a sequence of time periods, each with a speciﬁc bt and share λt of skilled
workers, but with a constant ﬂexibility of unskilled labor al.
Normalize a2 to zero. The fraction of workers with skills is exogenous but potentially
changing over time (λt). Since the skill premium is calculated as the return to college, the
fraction skilled is the fraction of college educated workers.6 The ﬂexibility parameter for
capital, b, varies over time exogenously. The interpretation is that the ratio of ﬁxed to
marginal costs for capital changes over the century. Fixed costs are relatively unimportant
for the craft industry. The rise of mass production stems from a technology where a ﬁxed
cost is followed by the low marginal cost of the assembly line. Flexible manufacturing lowers
the importance of the ﬁxed cost as huge factories are no longer required to take advantage of
mechanization.
As a benchmark assume f(k,l) is Cobb-Douglas, lαk1−α. The parameter α is taken to
b e. 6 6t or e ﬂect the ratio of labor’s share to capital’s share of output. As a benchmark, let
γ = .9, which implies that the share of income accounted for by ﬁxed factors is ten percent.
6The results do not hinge crucially on this fraction. Alternatives are considered in the next section.
16McGrattan and Prescott (2000) report that “intangible capital,” which can be interpreted as
the sort of managerial input that is congested and leads to decreasing returns at the plant
level, has a ﬁve percent share of output. If structures are thought of as a ﬁxed factor, some
of their 15 percent share should be included. Gort et al. (1999) use a seven percent “proﬁt
rate,” which corresponds to γ = .93 in the model. In the next section we consider a variety
of values for γ.
What is left to parameterize is the sequence of bt and the low skill ﬂexibility al.T h o s e
parameters are chosen so that the model replicates the average manufacturing plant size in
each period, and so that the skill premium in the ﬁnal period (1995) is matched exactly.7
There are T+1 equations necessary to uncover the T+1 unknowns, namely the sequence of
bt and the constant al.
If the optimal size at time t of a plant with high skill workers is L2,t and with low skill










There are T such equations to match the average size in each period, plus an equation for
the skill premium in 1995.
The model’s predicted skill premium for the century is reported in Figure 4.
7It is straightforward to match the average skill premium over the century. The results from that pa-
rameterization are very similar, since the model’s predicted skill premium in that case is quite close to the
premium in 1995.
8Since the consumer has Cobb-Douglas preferences, the total amount of labor devoted to manufacturing
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Figure 4: Cobb-Douglas Model
The R2 of this model is .66.
T h em o t i v ei nu s i n gc a p i t a lﬂexibility as a driving force for change is evidence that nu-
merically controlled machines bring increased ﬂexibility (Comin (2000), Milgrom and Roberts
(1990)). The model generates a measure of the magnitude of the change in ﬂexibility of capi-
tal. From the peak in plant size (around 1970) until the last data point (in 1995), the per-task
setup cost for capital falls by slightly more than a third in the model. The calibration implies
that the ratio of setup costs for unskilled labor to the unskilled labor wage bill is about 10
percent throughout the century.
The model predicts a large fraction of the variation in the skill premium, in a man-
ner qualitatively similar to the simple calculation with exogenous labor. The next section
considers some alternative parameters to check the robustness of the experiment.
18Robustness
Various changes to the parameters above were considered. As a variant from the
assumed Cobb-Douglas form for f(k,l), consider instead the extreme case where f(k,l) is
Leontief, the opposite end of the empirically relevant range. The results were very similar, in
terms of R2 for the model’s predicted skill premium relative to the data; the model is a bit
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Figure 5: Leontief Case
As a century-long series for the college premium is readily available, λt has been taken
from data on college education; one might think that is peculiar since it is such a low number
(around 3%) at the early part of the century, or because of a deﬁnition of skills other than
those that come from college education. To verify that supply side changes are not at the
heart of the model’s prediction, another approach to λ is considered. Imagine deﬁning skills
to be the top 20% of the population, so λ = .20 constantly. The exercise with constant λ
is not consistent with using the college premium, but is useful since studies show that other
19measures such as 80/20 ratios move in a similar manner to the college premium for various
periods of the century. In addition, since a precise value of γ is not available, the computation
was rerun with γ ranging from .8 (using all of the share of intangible capital and structures) to
.95 (in excess of the Gort, et al. (1999) ﬁgure, adding nothing for structures). The following




γ =.80 .64 .60
γ =.90 .66 .60
γ =.95 .61 .57
λ:College λ:20%
γ =.80 .66 .60
γ =.90 .64 .59
γ =.95 .50 .56
The results are not altered substantially; the model explains an important fraction of
the variation, with an R2 between .56 and .66 in all but one of the 12 cases, despite using
extreme parameter values. The supply of skills plays only a small role in the model: when
the supply of skills is low, the fraction of small plants (the ones with highly skilled workers)
falls, and so capital must become more ﬂexible to maintain the same average plant size.
Comparing the beginning of the century to the end, the plant size is similar, so the model
implies a similar b and therefore a similar skill premium if λ is the same. The low λat the
turn of the century means that capital must be more ﬂexible to generate the same plant size
prediction, and therefore the predicted skill premium is higher at the start of the century
when λ varies.
20In addition, the skill premium was computed for the “small economy” case where the
interest rate was ﬁxed and the speciﬁcation of the non-manufactured sector and consumer
preferences is not important. The results were almost the same as the ones reported above,
where the general equilibrium is computed. The results do not depend critically on the
speciﬁcation of the model outside of the manufactured goods technology.
The key channel in the model is that changes in the optimal plant size aﬀect special-
ization and in turn aﬀect wages. Because of evidence that machines became more ﬂexible
at the end of the century, the driving force of change has been taken to be the ﬂexibility of
capital. Another natural force in determining plant size is returns to scale (γ), which has
been held constant in this exercise. Another experiment would be to hold constant the ﬁxed
costs from ﬂexibility of the inputs (a and b), and vary the returns to scale parameter γ to
match the varying average plant size over the century.
In order to see how successful this might be, let γ1995 = .85, in the middle of the
relevant range, and choose the ﬁxed costs of high skill and low skill plants (equivalent to
using a1 +b and b from the model of ﬂexibility) to match precisely the average size of plants
and skill premium in 1995. Then, holding ﬁxed these a1 and b,c h o o s eγt for all other time
periods to match the average size of plants in each period. For 1995, a relatively small value
of γ (.85) is chosen from the reasonable range since the computed γt is the lowest when the
skill premium is highest. The middle of the century returns values for γ closer to one. The
simulation produces similar results to the earlier experiment, in terms of having an R2 just
above 0.6. The important feature of the model — and the message of the paper — is that
specialization increases with plant size and decreases the skill premium.
215. Industry Evidence
A. The Size-Wage Premium
One seemingly counterfactual feature of the model is that in the cross section of man-
ufacturing plants arising in equilibrium, larger plants hire lower skilled workers and therefore
pay lower wages. A long tradition of empirical work (for instance Davis and Haltiwanger
(1991) and Brown and Medoﬀ (1989)) ﬁnds the reverse to be the case. The panel of industry
aggregate data for manufacturing from 1977-1994 is suﬃcient to show this relationship.9 It
includes data on average size and average wages for each industry. Industries with higher
average size pay higher average wages, as the standard literature suggests. This correlation
can be illustrated in the panel by estimating the simple regression
w
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t is deﬁned as compensation of production workers divided by hours of production
workers and li
t is production workers per establishment. β is positive and signiﬁcant. The
results are similar from the cross-sectional regression run year-by-year. On the other hand,









9These data, unlike the plant level data, are freely available as a panel, with these years in machine
readable form.
22gives a signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcient for β.10 The interpretation is that, conditional
on the size of plants in an industry on average over time, increases in size are negatively
associated with the wages paid. The relationship in (2) is robust to controlling for total
employment in the industry, so the relationship is not simply caused by increases in total
employment leading to the industry hiring less and less capable workers.
To interpret changes in the cross section of industries, consider a model with many

























where α < 1.























We have the following similar comparative static to the prior section:
Proposition 2. Suppose γ > ε−1
ε .I f bi is higher, then industry i has larger plants for a
10It is also more than twice as large, in absolute value, as the one computed without the ﬁxed eﬀect for
industry.
23given skill level j and pays lower wages in equilibrium.
Suppose that there is some exogenous, permanent diﬀerence across industries that
makes plants larger, for instance returns to scale. Further, assume that the industries with
larger plants have an exogenous beneﬁt for hiring workers with more skill. The explanation
for this exogenous variation could be any of a number of standard theories of the size-wage
premium (see Brown and Medoﬀ (1989) for a discussion). The size-wage premium would
emerge, as industries with big plants pay workers more. If, in addition, b changes over time,
t h en e g a t i v er e l a t i o n s h i pi nt h eﬁxed eﬀects regression can emerge from the force described
in proposition 2. As b falls for a given industry, the plants get smaller and hire more highly
skilled workers. The model can admit an auxiliary explanation for the size-wage premium,
and the force of changes in b can help account for relationships in the ﬁxed eﬀects regression.
A more complete analysis of the relationship between downsizing and wages, using plant level
data, is a topic for future analysis.
B. Evidence on Technology, Size, and Wages
Goldin and Katz (1998) report that industries that underwent organizational change
in the ﬁrst part of the century leading to batch methods of production hired more skilled
workers than did industries that moved to traditional assembly line methods. They point out
(p. 698) that the “data for 1909 to 1940 is consistent with the notion that the transition from
the factory to continuous-processes increased the relative demand for skilled workers” while
the “transition, from the artisanal shop to the factory, appears to have involved an opposite
force.”
It is not surprising that the skill premium was falling, on the whole, during the ﬁrst
24half of the century since the plant size data suggest that the rise of mass production was
leading to increased specialization (see also Chandler (1977)). However, for those industries
that did move to batch processes during that period (the industry with falling bi, allowing for
ﬂexible batch production), the result was the hiring of a more skilled workforce. They hired
more skilled workers both because their organizational form dictated it as well as because
the relative cost of hiring skilled workers was falling. In the latter part of the century, on the
other hand, industries adopting batch processing technologies with ﬂexible capital were the
dominant force, as seen in the downward trend in average manufacturing plant size.
Dunne, et al. (2000) report that the wage premium between plants that have high
computer investment per worker and those that have low computer investment per worker
has risen. Since computers are closely connected to ﬂexible machines, this is consistent with
the idea that some industries adopted new, ﬂe x i b l et e c h n o l o g i e sa n di nt u r nd e m a n d e dm o r e
skilled workers, driving up their relative wage.
Suppose that industries which are intensive in ﬂexible manufacturing have achieved
increased unmeasured quality of capital. Then total factor productivity growth is a proxy for










t is the rate of total factor productivity growth in industry i at time t.T h e
coeﬃcient β is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that industries that adopted these tech-
nologies downsized, as the model predicts would happen as a result of more ﬂexible capital.










yields a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for β.S ot h ei d e at h a tﬂexible machinery has led
to smaller plants and higher wages is in accord with at least this basic analysis.
Ingram and Neumann (2000) suggest that certain skills, particularly mathematical
skills, have seen a particularly high return over the recent U.S. experience. To the extent
that numerically controlled machines are said to put more focus on mathematical skills, their
ﬁnding is consistent with the explanation in this paper.
6. Summary
Explanations of the recent rise in the skill premium have centered on the role of skill-
biased technological change. The experience of the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ec e n t u r ys h o w st h a tt h e
nature of technological change has an important impact on whether it relatively favors the
skilled or unskilled. The rise of mass production made ﬁxed costs high relative to marginal
costs. Later, ﬁxed costs became less important.
Data from plant size are used to understand the degree of specialization of labor over
the century. The model assumes that specialization relatively favors the unskilled; routinized
j o b s ,v e r yn a r r o wi ns c o p e ,c a nb ea c c o m p l i s h e de ﬃciently by a wide variety of workers.
The model is parameterized to match the facts on the organization of production throughout
the century, as well as the skill premium at the end of the century. The results show that
using evidence from the organization of production can aid in the understanding of the skill
26premium.
The model provides an explanation for why technological change seems to be skill-
biased at times and de-skilling at others. The key is whether or not the technological change
made workers more specialized, as with the rise of “Fordist” mass production, or less special-
ized, as with the recent adoption of numerically controlled machines. Using plant size as a
measure of specialization, times of high plant size seem to correlate with times of relatively
low returns to skill. Moreover, studies of industries that adopted technologies near the be-
ginning of the century which had the batch-process ﬂavor of the technologies which became
more prevalent at the end of the century show that technologies which make workers less
specialized have been skill biased even at times when the aggregate trend is the reverse.
There are three ingredients to the explanation of the connection between plant size
and the skill premium. First, the ability of capital to do a wide variety of tasks has changed
over time. When capital can do a wider variety of tasks, it can be divided into more plants
to avoid plant-level decreasing returns.
Second, changes that increase capital per plant also increase labor per plant. In order
to show that ﬂexible capital leads to smaller plants and a higher skill premium, capital must
be suﬃciently complementary to labor, relative to the decreasing returns at the plant level.
This restriction is natural, in the sense that if it is violated, plants that are large in terms
of employment are the smallest in terms of capital, which is counterfactual. The important
feature is that jobs are more specialized as plants get larger.
The ﬁnal ingredient is that, for labor, skills make a worker relatively more productive
at doing a variety of tasks. Low skilled workers are particularly eﬀective when they are given
a small scope of tasks to perform, and therefore, are relatively more productive when capital
27is inﬂexible and optimally allocated into fewer, larger plants.
Sokoloﬀ (1986) stresses that changes in the organization of production in the ﬁrst
half of the century were not necessarily linked to physical capital. Although the results take
capital ﬂexibility as the driving force of change, it is not essential. The changing nature of
capital is taken as the force of change because it has been suggested as an important one for
the latter part of the century. The basic message, that changes in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ec e n t u r y
increasing plant size led to more specialized jobs, and that this lowers the skill premium, does
not depend on this particular formulation.
The model holds ﬁxed many factors that are important over the century. The scope
of plants is ﬁxed. The supply of skills is exogenous. In view of the limitations of the model,
the extent to which it succeeds in explaining the broad patterns of the skill premium over
the century make it a starting point for future analysis of the role of the organization of
production in determining the skill premium. This connection provides a foundation for
understanding the causes of skill bias in technological change.
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Denote the task level production function by
f(k,l)=( αk




with α ∈ (0,1). Take two skill levels ah and al with ah <a l. To show that the skill premium
for type h is decreasing in b, ﬁrst consider the case of γ = ε−1
ε , i.e., ρ = γ.I nt h a tc a s e ,t h e
proﬁt function for a plant hiring a given type of labor
pA
γ(αk
ρ +( 1− α)l
ρ)
γ
ρ − Awl − Ark − wAa− Ab (A1)
is separable in capital, so b has no eﬀect on the wage. For ρ →− ∞ , the Cobb-Douglas case,
it is easy to verify by direct calculation that the log wage premium is
s =l o gwh − logwl = η (log(al + b) − log(ah + b))
for some positive constant η,s os is clearly decreasing in b for small enough ρ.
The range γ > ε−1
ε corresponds to −∞ < ρ < γ.S i n c eds
db =0for ρ = γ and ds
db < 0
for ρ →− ∞ ,t h e ni fds
db is positive for some ρ in the range, the implicit function theorem
implies that there is some ρ in the range where ds
db =0 . We now show that this implies a
contradiction, i.e., that ds
db =0is impossible in equilibrium.








ρ − wjlj − rkj − wjaj − b =0
where kj and lj are the input choices per task of a ﬁrm hiring labor of type j.D i ﬀerentiating




















































so the log wage diﬀerential is















db =0 , dx
db must be zero since
d(loglh−logll)
db =0 .
But this implies wh = wl, which is impossible for al >a h (both could not make zero proﬁts).
Therefore, ds
db < 0 for all ρ ∈ (−∞,γ).
To show that size is increasing in b, ﬁrst I show that size is increasing in b for plants
with each skill level of worker j.F r o m( A 2 ) ,
dwj
db < 0.F r o m( A 3 ) ,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tlj
is decreasing in the wage, so lj is increasing in b, i.e., workers per plant of type j are rising
in b.
Since workers per plant for the plants that hire type j are
λj
plantsj, the number of plants
must be decreasing in b for all j. Since, given the Cobb-Douglas preferences, total spending
on each good is constant, the total of capital and labor employed in the non-manufactured
good is independent of b. Since the capital-labor ratio in manufacturing is constant, the




Since the number of plants is decreasing in b for all j, the sum must be as well, so average
34size is increasing in b.
Proposition 2.
The previous proposition established that size lj is increasing in b for plants with a










dj ≥ 0 and lj is increasing in b,( A 4 )i sd e c r e a s i n gi nb. Therefore the higher is b,t h e
less is the beneﬁt to employing additional skill, and therefore industries with higher b will
employ lower skilled workers.
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